Posted By Alireza Nader, Robert Stewart
Wednesday, April 3, 2013 - 12:39 PM
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The role and plight of ethnic minorities in Iranian society
tends to receive little attention from Western analysts and policymakers. This
may be largely due to the predominance of Tehran as the focal point of Iranian
culture, politics, and foreign policy. Moreover, Iran's ethnic minorities have
been heavily marginalized by Iran's Persian-dominated Shiite theocracy. The
suppression of minority rights has resulted in ethnic insurgencies over the
years, some of which continue to bedevil the Iranian regime.
Nevertheless, many Iranian officials, religious leaders, and
intellectuals, particularly those associated with the reformist movement, have
come to view Iran's ethnic minorities as an essential component of the national
fabric. They have also come to realize that the Iranian regime's repression and
discrimination against minorities has not only slowed Iran's advancement, but
it could one day jeopardize the survival of the Islamic Republic -- and even
Iran's territorial integrity.
Non-Persian ethnic minorities make up roughly 40 to 50
percent of Iran's population. The main minority groups are Turkish-speaking
Azerbaijanis, Kurds, Arabs, Baluch, and smaller populations of Armenians,
Turkmen, and Lors. Iranian Turkish speakers, most of whom are Shiites, tend to
be closely integrated into Iranian society and politics, although they too
suffer some cultural and political discrimination. Kurds and the Baluch are
mostly Sunni and thus subjected to the highest level of discrimination by
Iran's Shiite theocracy.
From the time of Reza Shah Pahlavi (1925-1941), the Iranian
central government has attempted to mold ethnic minority groups into the
state's vision of an ideal Iranian nation. Reza Shah used military might to
suppress and subjugate minority groups, banned the writing of non-Persian
languages, and made Persian the national language of Iran. The Persianization of
Iran continued under Reza Shah's son, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi (1941-1979).
Whereas the Pahlavi dynasty attempted to reshape Iran into a
more homogenous, Persian-centric, and Western-leaning society, the Islamic
Republic has attempted to reconstruct a theocratic Shiite Persian-centric
nation. For both regimes, unassimilated minorities represented a threat to the
construction of a prescribed national identity. In addition, Iran's central
government has persistently feared the exploitation of Iranian minorities by
foreign powers, including Britain, the United States, Israel, and even Saudi
Arabia. The Islamic Republic, like the Pahlavi monarchy, has engaged in the
violent suppression of minority rights.
Nevertheless, the conservative and reformist wings of the
Islamic Republic have varying perceptions of and policies toward ethnic
minorities. The conservatives, largely made up of the traditional clergy, the
Revolutionary Guards, and allied businessmen, prefer the status quo: a heavily
Persianized Shiite theocracy that marginalizes non-Shiites and non-Persian
ethnic minorities.
Reformists, on the other hand, have proposed policies to
integrate Iran's minorities by expanding political power beyond the traditional
elite. Mohammad Khatami's election as president in 1997 was made possible by
his appeal to minority voters, especially women and ethnic groups. As
president, he implemented village and city council elections, which gave ethnic
minorities the right to vote for their local representatives. Khatami also strengthened
civil society in ethnic regions. Toward the end of his presidency, his
Management and Planning Organization proposed a policy to allocate more
administrative posts at the regional and provincial levels, which would allow
for more ethnic minority participation.
Despite the common Western perception that Iran's
conservative base lies in its underdeveloped rural society, voting patterns
since the establishment of the Islamic Republic show that ethnic minorities
(who often live in the most undeveloped rural areas) turn out to vote en masse
when a candidate supports their rights.
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's ultra-conservative presidency
(2005-2013) has witnessed a more widespread campaign of intimidation against
Arabs, the Kurds, and the Baluch, including mass arrests and summary execution
of minority activists. Ahmadinejad, who has occasionally paid lip service to
minority rights, has not seen non-Persians as an essential component of the
political system or as a way to enhance his quest for greater political power.
Rather, he has sought to silence those opposed to his political views,
especially reformists.
The reformist candidates in the 2009 presidential election,
including Mir Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi, promoted Khatami's policies
on minority rights. Mehdi Karroubi, for example, called for equal rights for
all Iranians regardless of ethnicity. Mousavi, like Karroubi, espoused the
rights of religious minorities and vowed, if elected, to ensure the rights
guaranteed to ethnic minorities in Iran's constitution. Mousavi also supported
minority-language education in Iranian schools.
The regime's violent crackdown on civil society activists
after the 2009 presidential elections widened the gulf between ethnic
minorities and the Iranian regime. But the reformist movement's failure to
implement any meaningful changes or effectively confront the ruling regime may
have also disappointed minority rights activists.
The extent to which the reformists will try to remobilize
ethnic minorities in the lead-up to the June 2013 presidential election remains
to be seen. Prominent reformists, such as Abdullah Nouri, former minister of interior
under Khatami, have emphasized a need for reformists to devise a political plan
that can address all the peoples of Iran, especially ethnic minorities. Former President
Khatami has insisted that demand for ethno-religious minority rights accompany
free and open elections.
However, the reformists may have to contend with a
disenchanted ethnic constituency, especially given their lack of political
nerve and organization after the 2009 election. Moreover, the reformists are
unlikely to play an effective role within the regime because the ruling elite largely
views them as "seditionists." Ethnic minorities and supporters from the Persian
majority will not follow the reformists if they continue to avoid an aggressive
challenge to the political system, including demands that Iran's constitution
be revised to allow for a democratic system that encompasses minority rights.
It is unlikely that either the conservatives or the
reformists can effectively appeal to and mobilize Iran's large ethnic minority
population. Most non-Persians appear to desire greater rights within their
country, rather than outright secession from Iran. But marginalized from
society, Iranian ethnic minorities may choose a path of political apathy. On
the other hand, Tehran's refusal to acknowledge minority rights may lead to
future ethnic insurgencies and uprisings.
Iran's quickly declining economy and its increasing
international isolation have led to general dissatisfaction among the Iranian
public. As a result, ethnic minorities and their Persian brethren could join
forces to pose a serious and perhaps unstoppable challenge to the Islamic
Republic -- and to conservatives and reformists alike.
Alireza Nader is a
senior policy analyst and Robert Stewart is a research assistant at the
nonprofit, nonpartisan RAND Corporation.
http://mideast.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/04/03/iran_s_forgotten_ethnic_minorities
